What if the German Empire had no colonies -> Better performance in WWI?

Except by the time the the absolute check was sent to Vienna, it was 100% clear the Tsar would not back down. Not after the humiliation from the Bosnian crisis in 1908. If Willy actually wanted to avoid war, he would have told Vienna "yeah, no. You need to accept Serbia's acceptance of all but one of your demands".
You're clearly not understanding how Germany works or how hard Wilhelm tried to avoid the war. Wilhelm was not an absolute monarch, despite his pretensions. He tried to avoid war, but not everyone in the German government did. He was in contact with the Tsar all through July trying to avoid war.

Also, from Germany's point of view, if they leave Austria out to dry, they wouldn't have any allies on the continent. It would be diplomatic suicide. And you're also conveniently ignoring the French "blank check" to Russia, which emboldened them. You're ignoring that the Russians mobilized first, intending to escalate a local conflict into a major one despite not having any treaties with Serbia.
 
You're clearly not understanding how Germany works or how hard Wilhelm tried to avoid the war. Wilhelm was not an absolute monarch, despite his pretensions. He tried to avoid war, but not everyone in the German government did. He was in contact with the Tsar all through July trying to avoid war.

Also, from Germany's point of view, if they leave Austria out to dry, they wouldn't have any allies on the continent. It would be diplomatic suicide. And you're also conveniently ignoring the French "blank check" to Russia, which emboldened them. You're ignoring that the Russians mobilized first, intending to escalate a local conflict into a major one despite not having any treaties with Serbia.
People forget that Serbia was Europe own Afganistán and black hand a Slavic al Qaeda, regardless the excuse was there.

Nice to mention the french blank check too
 
They got some fighting experience out of all the rebellions in Namibia and Tanzania, without it they'd be in the same position as Austria-Hungary, not having fought a war in half a century. I can't possibly see how this would be a positive thing.
 
Germany had already denied support to Austria-Hungary in a potential invasion of Serbia back in 1912. It did not lead the a collapse of the alliance and German isolation, because Germany had no obligation to help them in an offensive war. Nothing had changed in their alliance between then and 1914, except for Germany's confidence in how quickly such a war would be won. Any illusions that Germany had to help were shattered when Italy declared its neutrality due to AH being the aggressor.

This is not at all the same as the French stance for Russia, because France and Russia had already agreed during the Balkan Wars that due to the importance of Serbia to Russia a war between the Russians and Austro-Hungarians over Serbia would be within the terms of their agreement, and would therefore result in French intervention. This was not some secret clause, this was not some in the moment decision on the part of France, this was a publicly known agreement that had been in force for nearly two years.​
 
For that matter, do protectorates and concessions count as colonies for purposes of this discussion?
If you're bringing it up, gonna do the courtesy of listing those in distinction from the formal colonies?

I don't actually care much, I think they should count, as Nivek said.

This was not some secret clause, this was not some in the moment decision on the part of France, this was a publicly known agreement that had been in force for nearly two years.
You are putting some emphasis on this public knowledge aspect, of France giving fair warning to Germany and Europe of its extended alliance "coverage".

Was Germany's denial of support for an Austrian invasion of Serbia in 1912 known in Europe? I mean everybody knew Austria did not invade Serbia, but did anyone *know* the Austro-German dynamic- Austria pushing, Germany restraining, or could it only be guessed or inferred?

Was Europe *surprised* by the German-Austrian dynamic in 1914? Austria pushes and Germany and Germany says "have at it"? Did the "surprise" matter, or they just couldn't or wouldn't care? And did the Entente countries even *know* the Austro-German decision dynamic of 1914, before the Austrians started bombarding Belgrade and DoW'ed them?
 
Was Germany's denial of support for an Austrian invasion of Serbia in 1912 known in Europe? I mean everybody knew Austria did not invade Serbia, but did anyone *know* the Austro-German dynamic- Austria pushing, Germany restraining, or could it only be guessed or inferred?
Yes. The Balkan crisis was kept under wraps by cooperation between the powers. British Foreign Minister Grey depended on German support in his efforts to keep Austria in check. Part of the reason he was surprised by the outbreak of WW1 was because he expected Germany to once again hold Austria back. What he didn’t know was that Wilhelm, and his ministers, had determined that they would not do that again.
 
Yes. The Balkan crisis was kept under wraps by cooperation between the powers. British Foreign Minister Grey depended on German support in his efforts to keep Austria in check. Part of the reason he was surprised by the outbreak of WW1 was because he expected Germany to once again hold Austria back. What he didn’t know was that Wilhelm, and his ministers, had determined that they would not do that again.
So Grey, in the absence of updated information, assumed Germany would keep letting Britain free-ride, and keep its Entente partnerships with France and Russia light and easy, no embarrassing having to tell those Entente partners "no", or "don't do it", or "not for Serbia, nope," and Grey figured Germany would keep on doing hard work, at its *own* alliance's expense, telling Austria-Hungary *no*.

I guess German appeasement and restraint in 1912 created a permissive environment for miscalculation in multiple Entente circles, and for Serbian and Russian terrorism, irredentism, aggression and brinkmanship. It left them baffled and flummoxed when Germany and Austria did not back down in 1914.

Sort of reversal of roles from how Britain under Chamberlain's movement from appeasement over Czechoslovakia in 1938 to firmness over Poland in 1939, was incomprehensible to Hitler (and Stalin) and left them incredulous.
 
So Grey, in the absence of updated information, assumed Germany would keep letting Britain free-ride, and keep its Entente partnerships with France and Russia light and easy, no embarrassing having to tell those Entente partners "no", or "don't do it", or "not for Serbia, nope," and Grey figured Germany would keep on doing hard work, at its *own* alliance's expense, telling Austria-Hungary *no*.
Well, that’s a strange take.

Diplomatic activity was not only existant within alliance groups. In this case Germany and Britain were both applying pressure to restrain Austria and Russia. Neither nation saw it as being in their interest for a Great Power conflict to break out. So they did what they could to discourage immediate action and arranged for an ambassadorial meeting with all Great Powers (Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, Britain, France, and Italy). Between December 1912 and August 1913 the ambassadors of these nations met in London to work out their diplomatic demands without becoming directly involved. Grey presided and acted as a useful mediator between Austria and Russia.

Having worked out their differences, the powers then had significant leverage to wield in enforcing a satisfactory peace on the combatants in the Treaty of London 1913.

Having successfully followed this formula the year before, with Germany as an active and engaged participant, Grey expected a similar response in 1914 which would allow for a similar conference. A point he offered and called for multiple times. However, Germany had determined that they would not restrain Austria a second time and France and Russia had hardened their own stances on the independence of Serbia. So Grey’s calls for Great Power Conference’s to work out differences went unheeded. And generally unanswered.
 
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Let's sy Bismarck ignores the pressure of the parties and the population and doesn't support colonies because originally he hated colonies
The causes of Bismarck’s shift to support of formal colonies are debated, but generally it is thought to have been caused by both domestic and foreign affairs.

On the domestic side, the colonial societies and the merchants of Northern German port cities (Hamburg in particular) had been gaining steam and popularity. Their calls for colonial expansion could still have been ignored, but not without risk.

Additionally the colonial proposals were supported by the National Liberal party in the Reichstag. They had been allied with Bismarck until his turn to protectionism in 1879. And had lost their leading place in the Reichstag in 1881. Some of the party split off to the left but the remainder ended up allied with the Conservatives who were Bismarck’s new base of support. It seems likely that the colonial support from Bismarck was a part of the process of welding this alliance. Additionally, the support for colonies can be seen as an extension of the change to protectionism. Bismarck was effectively granting imperial protection to already existing German economic interests.

It’s also speculated that Bismarck wanted to create tension with Britain before the Anglophile Fredrick became Emperor, but that seems less likely to me.

On the foreign side of the equation the gaining of colonies was often seen as a sign of Great Power status. And thus the German acquisition of them was seen as extending the principle of balance of power over the whole world.

Bismarck didn’t support the colonies without reason, in other words. So if he doesn’t support them ITTL it’s possible it will cause him political issues. Probably not enough to sink him, but possibly enough to make his job harder.

And in any case, Bismarck will still be moved out by Wilhelm in 1890. Wilhelm wanted more direct rule, and Bismarck was an obstacle to that. After 1890, it is Wilhelm’s opinion that would matter, and it seems unlikely that he would hold back from formalizing those existing commercial interests with colonies.

Would that also mean that Germany would probably not invest in the 2nd largest navy?
Wilhelm also wanted a fleet. And he supported Tirpitz because Tirpitz could give it to him. Tirpitz actually deprioritized the colonies as a driver for the navy, shifting to building against the RN (with predictably bad results for the relationship with Britain). So little is likely to change on the naval score.

What could change things is Heligoland. The Germans had wanted Heligoland for some time. Had tried to negotiate for it several times in fact. But they had backed off to avoid distracting from other issues, and due to the reluctance of British governments to talk about it. Salisbury bringing it into the discussions on East Africa was a surprise to all parties. But the Germans jumped on the chance regardless.

Without formal imperial support for Carl Peters work in East Africa, there is no negotiation on trading the protectorate over Zanzibar for Heligoland. That means that the Germans are stuck trying to negotiate for it directly. And though the British massively undervalued the island, it was politically difficult to give it away. Salisbury faced significant criticism for it even IOTL. This is likely to be a continual point of tension between the two nations. The island is a massive problem for any German naval campaign with a hostile Britain. I could see Salisbury being open to trading it for something but I am not sure what the Germans would have to offer for it. And German diplomacy got progressively worse through the 1890’s and 1900’s. Which seems unlikely to endear the British public to giving away British territory to Germany.
 
I think colonies are overrated as a liability for Germany, simply because they were not retained in WWI and were not defensible, or really reachable during the war. It does not mean they were especially costly for Germany compared to what Britain's colonies cost Britain, France's cost France, Belgium's cost Belgium, Portugal's cost Portugal, Italy's cost Italy, Japan's cost Japan, etc.

I think they are also overrated as a root cause of Anglo-German hostility, simply because Britain and Germany did end by on opposite sides of WWI, and ended up aftwerd ruling over several former German colonies. But other causes of Anglo-German hostility and war were much more important than colonies, and colonial denial was only one form of punishment/disability Britain imposed on defeated Germany.
 
If Germany doesn't take any colonies, does the Berlin Conference still happen? Depending on how European imperialism is "organized" so to speak, that could lead to a very different diplomatic situation or maybe even an early war with alternate alliances. I'm of the opinion that without WWI, any further potential crises were more likely than not to be resolved diplomatically, and it took a series of unlikely events and unfortunate decisions to lead to WWI, both before and during the July Crisis.
 
If Germany doesn't take any colonies, does the Berlin Conference still happen? Depending on how European imperialism is "organized" so to speak, that could lead to a very different diplomatic situation or maybe even an early war with alternate alliances. I'm of the opinion that without WWI, any further potential crises were more likely than not to be resolved diplomatically, and it took a series of unlikely events and unfortunate decisions to lead to WWI, both before and during the July Crisis.
I think it will, Bismarck wanted to play the honest broker to see how Europe move
 
I think it will, Bismarck wanted to play the honest broker to see how Europe move
How do you think everyone would react if Germany didn't take anything for itself? I don't think Bismark by himself could've fully stopped it, so are there any PoDs that lead to other powers taking OTL's German colonies?
 
If Germany decides not to pursue any colonial endeavors or otherwise has no colonies by 1914, then it wouldn't surprise me if even more money is invested in the army. This would mean a much weaker navy though, certainly not strong enough to compete with the British like it did IOTL.
 
If Germany decides not to pursue any colonial endeavors or otherwise has no colonies by 1914, then it wouldn't surprise me if even more money is invested in the army. This would mean a much weaker navy though, certainly not strong enough to compete with the British like it did IOTL.
Whilhelm II had a personal love/hate relationship with Britain and he wanted a navy that could beat the Royal Navy, the navy would have a similar budget.
 
Whilhelm II had a personal love/hate relationship with Britain and he wanted a navy that could beat the Royal Navy, the navy would have a similar budget.
I can’t really see that coming to fruition though without any colonies since it would have had no pragmatic use. I can’t imagine Wilhelm II wanting a navy that could beat Britain’s just for showboating for most intents and purposes. Correct me if I’m wrong though.
 
I can’t really see that coming to fruition though without any colonies since it would have had no pragmatic use. I can’t imagine Wilhelm II wanting a navy that could beat Britain’s just for showboating for most intents and purposes. Correct me if I’m wrong though.
Having colonies isn't a good reason to antagonize Britain by actively trying to surpass them in naval capabilities.

CountryDreadnought Battleships and Battle Cruisers (Completed in Bold, Laid Down or Budgeted in Parentheses)Shipbuilding Expenditures in 1913 (Millions of Pounds Sterling, Current Prices)Percentage Increase in Shipbuilding Expenditures (1902–1904 to 1911–1913)
Germany22 (4)11,4131%
Austria-Hungary3 (5)4,4270%
Italy4 (6)4,3 (1912)246%
Britain34 (3)17,138%
France4 (12)7,041%
Russia0 (4)11,1105%
Turkey25,51100%
Whilhelm will start the naval race anyways.
 
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