Early 1866: Central and Northern Honshu
What could arguably be considered the main theatre of war was the conflict between the Bakufu and Tohokai in Kansai. Defeat for either side here would deliver the overwhelming majority of Japan’s resources to the victor, allowing them to potentially crush the National Protection Army under sheer weight of numbers. It was also home to the power centers of both the Tohokai and the Bakufu, the loss of which would cripple both factions even without considering the resources of Honshu.
The primary problem facing the Bakufu was almost cripplingly low morale. The Kansai Revolt, the rise of the National Protection Army, and the intervention of Korea had all left Bakufu forces with a feeling that their cause was doomed and that resistance merely prolonged the inevitable. While they were willing to go into battle, Bakufu commanders had to be wary of either overcommitting their forces or being perceived as losing too badly. This cautious approach to combat was somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy, as it meant that Bakufu forces tended to withdraw from battles at the first sign of trouble instead of fighting it out. The army reforms in the aftermath of the Court Address did much to improve matters, but it also revealed a deeply seated rot in which many of the soldiers were outright hostile to attempts to train them. This attitude would be literally shot out of them after a mutiny was bloodily put down by loyalist units. By the time spring arrived, the army had been whipped into a decent enough fighting shape. By summer, news of the Battle of Nakamura and the torching of NPA gunpowder at Kochi helped rekindle hope among Bakufu forces that their cause had a chance. Although the army was far from the well disciplined and highly motivated force that Yoshinobu wanted, it was competent and confident enough to allow for more pitched battles than the previous campaign season.
Perhaps the biggest failure of the Tohokai in the entire war would be their perpetual inability to truly gauge how poor of a shape the Bakufu’s army was in during the opening stages of the war. While their own army may not have been in the best condition either, their higher morale and fervor meant that had the RJA ever pushed themselves harder in pursuit of their opponents they likely would have completely destroyed the enemy as a cohesive battle formation.
But any concentration on the past is meaningless. The RJA failed to destroy the Bakufu and the war in Kansai continued to drag on. Preparations for the 1866 campaign season revolved mainly around making good the RJA’s deficiencies. With the decision to have veterans concentrated into individual regiments instead of spread across the army, RJA Supreme Commander Soma Kakazu chose to emphasize the training of soldiers in the rapid creation of field fortifications. While not every soldier could be expected to remain calm under fire in an open field, they could remain confident from behind their defenses.
The other major area that Kakazu concentrated on was the nearly non-existent artillery arm. Due to the RJA’s origins as a peasant rebellion, it lacked both artillery and the artillery crews needed to utilize them. Although eight cannons were liberated from Osaka, they were of poor quality and often lagged behind the army, only arriving in the aftermath of battle due to being treated as something of a siege train instead of a proper battlefield weapon. Kakazu sought to change this, and began training men in how to properly handle artillery. After months of petitioning, Kakazu was allowed to purchase twenty surplus 12 pounder Napoleon field cannons from the United States for the cost of $60,000 through Korean mediums. The cannons would arrive on May 4th, mere days before the Army of Kansai left its winter quarters. Its crews lacked anything more than basic training on how to handle their guns, but Kakazu was insistent that the RJA utilize its artillery.
The main target for 1866 was the subject of intense debate. By March, the list had narrowed to three targets: the Imperial capital at Kyoto, the important town of Nagoya along the Tokaido Road (a road linking Kyoto and Edo), or the city of Kofu at the base of Mt. Fuji. While Kyoto was treated as an open city due to informal agreement between the Tohokai and the Bakufu, debates on whether to violate this agreement came down to whether it was believed that the Bakufu could be brought to a decisive battle through desperation to protect the Imperial capital. Eventually it was decided that this strategy was unnecessarily antagonistic and would waste resources on a target that would only tangentially help them get to Edo.
With Kyoto ruled out, it was clear that the RJA would take the offensive, the only question was how far it would attempt to reach. While Kofu would place the RJA within easy striking distance of Edo, it was feared that it would be an overreach. Comparatively, capturing Nagoya would help to protect Kansai, would secure a major stop along the Tokaido Road, and would allow the RJA to remain close to its supply base should things go badly. It was also considered to have similar issues with Kyoto due to the small distances between it and Osaka. Eventually it was decided to have three stages of the offensive. The minimum goal for the year was to take Nagoya, with the Army of Kansai ordered to at the very least make attempts to march on Sunpu further up the Tokaido Road. If they still had momentum, then the RJA would make a play toward Kofu.
Despite it being outside of his required duties, Soma Kakazu would elect to personally accompany the Army of Kansai over significant protest from his compatriots. In a speech to Tohokai elites, he would declare that it was his duty as the one who determined how the army was trained to see how they held up in battle. Privately, he expressed serious concerns over the effectiveness of the artillery arm, the effect of the army being forced to slow down to match it, and the effects of needing to requisition and feed the horses necessary to transport them.
The 1866 campaign season in central Honshu began with the Bakufu marching out of their winter quarters at Nagoya on May 6th. Arriving near Nara on the 10th, they would force the Army of Kansai out of Osaka to meet them. The Battle of Nara would result in a nasty shock for the Bakufu when RJA artillery opened up on their lines. Although panic almost set in among the Bakufu soldiers, quick action by their officers and their new training kicking in allowed them to reorganize and withdraw into the town proper. Not wanting to damage the historic site, Kakazu personally intervened and ordered the town surrounded except for the road back to Nagoya and systematically cleared out. The Bakufu commander quickly recognized exactly what was occurring, and ordered a retreat before an avenue of death could be created. The Battle of Nara may have been a defeat for the Bakufu, but its army had proven it had the resilience necessary to potentially win the war.
Resilience was not the only thing the Bakufu needed, as the arrival of artillery on the battlefield meant that they would need to avoid fighting in open terrain if they didn’t want severe casualties. Taking inspiration from the fighting on Shikoku, Bakufu forces began to engage in hit and run tactics and avoiding open battle. Cavalry in particular was used to harass RJA forces and areas under Tohokai control, drawing from the cavalry raids launched during the American Civil War.
While the Tohokai may have wanted to simply ignore the raids as unimportant to final victory, they were aware that doing so would inflame public sentiment against them and force people to support the Bakufu for their own wellbeing. The Army of Kansai was forced to part with some 5,000 men to garrison the region against raids and to help organize local militias. To deal with the men harassing their army, they established numerous pickets and decided to force the Bakufu to battle by marching on Nagoya post-haste. The army, now numbering 35,000, smashed through any attempts to delay them and captured Nagoya on June 4. The Bakufu army had managed to evacuate most of its men, the remainder staying behind as raiders who would be flushed out over the next several months, but was powerless to stop the RJA from continuing onward. A garrison of 15,000 was left in Nagoya while the rest of the army surged along the Tokaido Road toward Shizuoka.
Seeing the need to stop the RJA advance, Bakufu forces, numbering 26,000, marshalled at the town of Hamamatsu. Hamamatsu was a coastal town along the Tokaido Road, but more importantly for the Bakufu its flanks were secured by mountains and Lake Hamana to the north. If the RJA wanted to continue their advance, they would either have to find another way around, limiting their artillery’s utility, or they would have to punch through the narrow road along the water’s edge.
The RJA arrived at Hamamatsu on May 25 and began scouting out Bakufu positions. Their artillery was set up, but neglected to fire in order to conserve ammunition. As the RJA and Bakufu engaged in potshots across their battlements, the weeks dragged on. Eventually a force that hadn’t been involved in the war for over a year reared its head to intervene: the Tokugawa Navy. Appearing off the coast in a foggy morning after deciding that the Koreans were not going to arrive, the four frigates of the Tokugawa Navy began taking potshots at RJA positions. Initially there was panic in RJA lines as the source of the bombardment was completely unknown. Scouts were dispatched across the lake to determine if the Bakufu had brought their own cannons to bear, spending hours fruitlessly searching before the fog cleared and the masts of frigates flying the black and white naval ensign became visible.
Fortunately for the RJA, the frigate crews were inexperienced with shore bombardment and had fired essentially blind into the morning fog. The result was that the damage inflicted was minimal and that the RJA was able to move its own cannons to the shore to return fire. While their range was insufficient to reach the frigates, they could at least force them to remain at a range where their fire would be highly inaccurate and have little effect. For all intents and purposes, the RJA artillery had been removed from the battle for Hamamatsu.
Kakazu took control of the army at this juncture. Unable to pursue his original battleplan of pounding Bakufu positions until they were forced to withdraw, he elected to personally lead a flanking attack through the northern mountains. After the arrival of 8,000 reinforcements from Nagoya, Kakazu took these veteran soldiers and advanced northward under the cover of darkness. In the dead of night, he fell upon the 6,000 men guarding the northern shore of Lake Hamana and systematically wiped them out. Although it cost him a fourth of his own men, he had scattered the northern guards and gave his men a few hour’s rest before marching southward.
Kakazu arrived on the northern flank of the Bakufu army three hours after survivors from the northern guard arrived to give warning. Fearing their encirclement yet again, Bakufu forces would launch a hasty offensive against Kakazu. For the second time in a day, Kakazu’s men were forced to engage in fierce fighting. Exhaustion would soon set in as their lines wavered, forcing a retreat. It would only be when Kakazu set off a firework, brought along specifically to signal the main army to attack, that relief would come as the RJA attempted to advance along the coast. Completely exhausted and whittled down to half their original strength, Kakazu’s men withdrew to the small town of Kiga on the northern shore of Lake Hamana. Two days later 5,000 men from the main army would arrive to replace them and allow the men to return to camp. The First Battle of Hamamatsu had ended in a bloody Bakufu victory with 5,000 men lost on their side and 5,500 lost by the RJA.
To the north, the Uesugi would enter into negotiations with Yoshinobu that dragged out months. Yoshinobu’s refusal to accept anything but their acceptance of his reforms as a key part of any agreement would eventually scuttle attempts to reconcile the two sides. It would not come to open conflict, but Yoshinobu made his determination to bring all of Japan under his domination clear. It also forced him to take new measures to appease the peasantry and gain new recruits for his army. He would begin to offer tax incentives to towns around Edo that could provide a percentage of their men as soldiers, starting at a tax reduction for 5% and going all the way up to four years without taxes if at least 75% of a town’s men agreed to become soldiers for up to four years.
While a great gamble financially, it led to tens of thousands of new recruits showing up, with some records indicating as many as 200,000 answering the call. This influx was far beyond anything Yoshinobu had foreseen, and he ended up sending all but 60,000 home. To avoid being viewed as a liar, Yoshinobu granted the entirety of Musashi Province a 50% decrease in taxes for the next four years. Mainly equipping these new recruits with matchlocks, Yoshinobu put them through their paces as an army to finally crush the Tohokai before bringing the rebellious daimyo to heel. While he was loath to admit it, it wasn’t the upstart lords that was his greatest threat, but the peasant rebellion turned revolution. When word of the First Battle of Hamamatsu reached him, he was able to respond by dispatching 20,000 fresh recruits to help his army recover from their losses.